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The initial work package in the IVOM project [IVOM06] comprises the evaluation of selected VO 
management systems to understand their suitability for efficiently supporting Shibboleth as an 
authorization infrastructure in Grids. As Shibboleth lacks an appropriate concept of representing 
Virtual Organizations (VO), several international projects work on solutions for this key Grid 
requirement. 
It is our objective to critically review the deliverables of these projects for suitability in IVOM and 
the D-Grid community projects. During the project kick-off several candidate projects were 
identified: gLite Shibboleth integration, GridShib, MAMS, myVocs, PERMIS, VOMS and 
VOMRS. This report contains the reviews and a comparison of these respective products or 
projects. 
 
2 SAML and Shibboleth  
2.1 Short Description 
The Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [SAML] is an XML-based standard issued by 
OASIS [OASIS], the Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards. It 
serves as a framework for exchanging authentication, entitlement and attributes information. 
Based on the foundation of SAML, Shibboleth [Shib] is a software package for building federated 
Authorization and Authentication Infrastructures (AAI). It supports features such as Single Sign on 
(SSO) across organizational boundaries. The three major components of Shibboleth are: 
• The Identity Provider (IdP) serves as a Policy Information Point (PIP). Each user has a 
home organization providing its own IdP. This IdP is responsible for managing the user’s 
metadata and making it available to SPs belonging to the same federation. 
• Shibboleth Service Providers (SPs) are arbitrary web-based resources that are protected by 
Shibboleth mechanisms. This means that a user trying to access such a resource is being 
forwarded to his home organization’s IdP for authentication instead of being authenticated 
by the resource itself. 
• The Where Are You From (WAYF) Service allows users to select their IdP, as it is 
impossible for an SP to determine the user’s IdP automatically. Each federation has 
exactly one WAYF (or none if the federation has only one IdP). 
This federated approach makes Shibboleth an ideal enhancement for Grid environments as VOs 
tend to be dynamically formed out of organizationally and geographically distributed users. By 
leveraging an existing (not necessarily Grid-specific) Shibboleth infrastructure, or implementing a 
new one specifically for Grid use, the creation of new VOs is simplified as user-specific data, such 
as name, address or affiliation, do not need to be re-acquired. Furthermore, IdPs can manage 
arbitrary attribute/value pairs. Thus IdPs can also manage VO-affiliation and roles within a VO and 
make this information available to Grid resources, which, in that case, act as Shibboleth SPs. 
Despite the advantages of using Shibboleth in Grids there are some problems that need to be 
addressed: 
• If an existing non Grid-aware federation is used it is not feasible to manage Grid-specific 
attributes like VO-membership by these IdPs. There is thus the need for another Attribute 
Authority (AA) specifically for Grid attributes. This can either be an additional Shibboleth 
IdP or another service like VOMS. This scenario is not yet covered by standard software 
but several international projects like myVocs and the efforts made by SWITCH described 
later in this document deal with it. 
• When SPs pull attributes from the IdP, the IdP discovery problem occurs. This means that 
an SP might not know which IdP is responsible for the user whose request it received. 
This problem can either be solved by embedding information identifying the user’s IdP or 
by embedding all necessary attributes into the request, i.e. by pushing all available 
attributes. 
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• When pushing attributes to the SP, e.g. by embedding it to the user’s proxy certificate in a 
Grid context, a problem similar to the IdP discovery problem occurs: The SP discovery 
problem. This means that it might not be known a priori which attributes will be needed 
by the SPs involved for authorization of the current request. It is thus not known which of 
the available attributes are to be pushed to the SP. This problem can also be solved in two 
ways: First it is possible to embed all available attributes into the job. This solution is not 
favorable as it unnecessarily increases the number of attributes that need to be embedded 
and it also raises confidentiality concerns as not all attributes associated with a user might 
be suitable for public exposure. The second solution is to agree upon a set of attributes 
within a VO that are sufficient for making authorization decisions on the Grid resources 
and pushing only those to SPs. 
2.2 Evaluation 
Shibboleth is the state of the art software for building federated AA-Infrastructures. Today, many 
international AAI projects like MAMS [MAMS], the German DFN-AAI [DFNAAI], the Swiss 
SWITCH AAI [SWaai] and the Finnish Haka federation [Haka] use Shibboleth. As compatibility to 
national and international AAIs is a key aim of IVOM, the use of at least some Shibboleth concepts 
and/or components for building a D-Grid AAI is virtually inevitable. 
 
3 Shibboleth and VO Management 
Shibboleth's federation model is two-tiered. The core concept of Shibboleth-based authorization is 
to have a single source of authority per user, which is the Identity Provider, based on the identity 
management at the user's home institution. A Service Provider may only request a given user's 
attributes from a single Identity Provider, the one it gets to know through the user's WAYF 
selection. 
With the wide acceptance of Shibboleth it was adapted in authentication and authorization realms 
outside the space of inter-institutional sharing of web resources. One such field was Grid AAI. The 
representation of virtual organizations in Shibboleth is a major issue for the integration of 
Shibboleth and Grid middleware. The „Grid problem“ – as the specific problem that underlies the 
Grid concept – has been identified as flexible, secure, coordinated resource sharing and problem 
solving among dynamic collections of individuals, institutions, referred to as virtual organizations 
[FKT01]. 
A virtual organization is a source of authority of its own. Users have specific roles in it and it 
confers specific rights to users. So, to make a well-informed access control decision based on all 
available attributes of a user, a SP would have to request assertions from the home institution and 
the VO. Due to Shibboleth's architecture this is not feasible. Besides, it would also raise the IdP 
discovery problem [ShibDS]. 
Therefore the additional source of authority had to fit into the given model. Based on previous 
work by Von Welch [Wel05], the MAMS project and the myVocs project four options were 
identified to achieve this: 
• VO management at the home institutions, based on participant's agreement on attributes, 
VO-specific information is located at the member's home institution. It is a moot point if 
institutions would accept modifications in their identity management systems. However, 
the major problem is trust (see chapter Trust Issues below): the home IdP is generally not 
the authoritative source for this information. 
• The VO operates its own IdP, which means extra work to run separate Identity 
Management (IdM) systems  and services. This approach would undermine the advantages 
of the Shibboleth concept of identity federation. 
• Decentralized VO management: VO attributes are centrally managed by the VO and 
stored distributed in the institutional IdM systems. The Internet2 tools Grouper [Grouper] 
and Signet [Signet] may in the future be the appropriate provisioning tools. This approach 
would need a new set of trust relations and associated policies, e.g. on attribute or 
namespace usage. A proof of concept is an open issue. 
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• IdP Proxy: VO management hooks into the communication flow between IdP and SP by 
acting as a SP when facing the IdP and acting as an IdP when facing the SP. Thereby it 
gathers the user’s home attributes, adds the VO-specific attributes and presents the 
resulting conglomerate assertion to the SP. This is the solution chosen by the developers 
of myVocs and IAMSuite, the MAMS VO system. 
As already pointed out, the management of virtual organizations was not on the agenda of the 
Shibboleth architects. This might change in the future as a discussion on a Shibboleth delegation 
profile has begun and the roadmap for Shibboleth v2 and beyond mentions applicable features. 
These extension requests are not yet assigned to a specific future version. If realized, however, they 
would free VO management in Shibboleth from being “the man in the middle” in the authorization 
process [Shib2] through the ability:  
• to link accounts between multiple Identity Providers and 
• to use linked accounts to gather attributes from multiple Identity Providers. 
 
3.1 Multiple VO Memberships 
Users are often members of multiple VOs. It is a standard requirement in Grid middleware that a 
user may use the rights from those VOs simultaneously [DGV, MVO05, YBC+07]. In Shibboleth 
terms this requirement would translate into the combined release of a user’s attributes from all his 
VOs.  
In production grids it is known that a user in most cases does not know which VO membership or 
entitlement is required to access a specific resource. Operating experience in higher education 
computer centers has shown that the majority of users does not care what attributes or entitlements 
they have, they just want to get their work done without running into access control barriers. We 
expect the typical user’s habit to be the complete release of all available attributes as long as there 
are no perceptible consequences. 
The IdP Proxy approach allows for the complete release of a user’s attributes from all his VOs, if 
all VOs are managed in one place. However, a massive problem occurs, if a user’s VO 
memberships are managed at different VO management systems. The user may only select one IdP 
proxy and would only get a assertion containing the attributes from one VO management system. 
We refer to this as the „IdP Proxy problem“. Today this problem can only be avoided by using one 
VO management system in a community or a federation.  
3.2 Trust Issues 
The TrustCoM project [TCM] recently remarked that VO management as developed for academic 
Grids, “has previously only addressed membership issues and has previously ignored Trust, 
Security and Contract management issues” [Trust05]. The introduction of Shibboleth and its 
federation concepts into Grids will at least address the trust issue. 
Trust in Shibboleth is based on the respective federation policy. In addition special arrangements 
may be made between IdPs and SPs. In practice, trust is utilized when an IdP releases user 
attributes at the request of a known SP and signs the assertion to confirm the reliability of the 
information contained. In other words: Information is requested, released and consumed in a 
bilateral, trustful communication process. 
VO management in Shibboleth as described above adds a third role to the process. The available 
systems intermediate the user’s IdP to a SP. This can be done in different ways: 
1. The home IdP’s original assertion is included in the VO-generated assertion.  
2. The VO extracts the attributes and includes them in its assertion. 
The first solution has the advantage that the assertion the user’s home IdP created is passed on 
unchanged. Still, to the SP the VO is the issuer of the conglomerate assertion and would be the first 
to contact in case of a problem. We see this as the best practice currently feasible. In general, the 
communities who will adopt this approach should be aware of the implicit trust issues. 
The second solution leads to a core problem in distributed systems: Who do you trust to say what 
about what or whom [Mor06]. Here, the VO acts as if it were the authoritative source for these 
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attributes. We consider this to be a bad practice and to be potentially dangerous for each VO 
provider as well as for the trust fabric of a federation in its entirety. 
 
4 gLite and Shibboleth: Work done by SWITCH  
4.1 Short Description 
The Swiss Research Network SWITCH has done work [FTLW07] in the area of providing 
interoperability between gLite VOMS and Shibboleth as part of the EGEE-II project
1
. 
The aim of this project is to integrate two sources of attributes: First, a Shibboleth IdP being part of 
a nationwide AA-Infrastructure provides general information about users, e.g. name, home 
organization and telephone number. Second, Grid-specific attributes are provided by a gLite 
VOMS. In order to make attributes of both AAs available to Grid resources for authorization 
decisions several possible implementations were evaluated by SWITCH: 
• Embed Shibboleth attributes in attribute certificates (AC): This approach implies the need 
for changes in the IdP-Software to issue VOMS-compatible ACs in addition to SAML 
assertions. 
• Embed Shibboleth attributes in the user’s X.509 certificate: This approach does not allow 
exposing only a minimally required subset of all available attributes but always exposes 
all of them. Furthermore the whole certificate would have to be revoked if only one 
attribute changes. 
• Grid resources request user attributes from the IdP: This approach implies the need for 
adding SAML processing functionality to all Grid resources. 
• Store Shibboleth attributes in VOMS: This approach uses the newly implemented 
functionality in VOMS to store arbitrary attribute-value-pairs. Shibboleth attributes can 
either be pulled from the IdP by the VOMS or they can be pushed to the VOMS by some 
means. The pull model is not feasible as it implies changes to the IdP software to support 
delegated access. For the push model means have to be found to actually execute the push 
process. 
The SWITCH project chose to store the Shibboleth attributes in VOMS using the push model. In 
order to allow for the pushing of Shibboleth attributes to VOMS they implemented the VOMS 
Attributes from Shibboleth (VASH) service. This service allows Grid users to control and initiate 
the transfer of Shibboleth attributes to a VOMS in form of a web-based application. One dedicated 
VASH service is needed for every desired combination of a Shibboleth federation and a VO 
managed by a VOMS. 
In this implementation, Shibboleth attributes are transferred from the IdP to the VOMS once per 
semester. The users themselves initiate the transfer by accessing the VASH web front end and they 
have full control over which attributes are transferred from the IdP to the VOMS. After a lifetime 
of six months the attributes expire in the VOMS and the user receives a notification per e-mail to 
refresh his attributes. 
This limitation has been caused by the current Shibboleth 1.3 version not offering a sufficient 
framework to implement more frequent automatic attribute updates. Building upon SAML 2.0 and 
the yet unreleased Shibboleth 2.0 it is planned by SWITCH to overcome this limitation and 
introduce attribute refresh times in the order of days or less. In that case users have to consent to 
the release of their attributes only once. Subsequent attribute updates will not need further user 
interaction. 
Additionally, the VASH service is already capable of working together with SLCs and can thus be 
used in conjunction with a GridShib CA. 
4.2 Evaluation 
The authors of this document have not tested the VASH service itself, as the software is not 
publicly available. The approach taken by this project is viable and meets the requirements the 
                                                           
1
 http://egee-technical.web.cern.ch/egee-technical/ 
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SWITCH project was initiated upon, i.e. usage in academic environments where Shibboleth 
attributes tend to change only at the beginning of a new semester. It has yet to be evaluated if its 
concepts or the VASH software itself can be integrated in the middleware-spanning VO-
management concept to be developed by IVOM.  
The main point of critique is the fact that Shibboleth attributes are replicated in the VOMS in time 
intervals in the order of months, defaulting to half a year. If Shibboleth attributes of a user change 
in that time, this change is not propagated to the VOMS. It is thus possible that authorization 
decisions on Grid resources are made based upon outdated attributes. The project does address this 
problem by assuming that the attributes managed by Shibboleth are not subject to frequent change. 
This is generally true for attributes like the user’s name, but authorization decisions will more 
likely rely on attributes as affiliation to a university, institute or project. If that affiliation ends, a 
user might not be eligible to use Grid resources. Using the VASH approach this information might 
not be available to Grid resources for several months. 
As SWITCH plans to overcome this limitation using Shibboleth 2.0 after its release, the VASH 
service needs to be re-evaluated at that time. 
 
5 Globus Toolkit and Shibboleth: GridShib  
5.1 Short Description 
GridShib [GridShib] is being developed as part of the Globus Project [Globus]. It is a collection of 
software aimed at allowing grid resources to make authorization decisions based on attributes 
managed by Shibboleth federations, i.e. by Shibboleth IdPs. Furthermore it includes functionalities 
to enable users to access grid resources without the need for long-lived certificates issued by a 
certificate authority (CA). The components and their dependencies can be seen in Figure 1. 
The four main components of GridShib are: 
• GridShib for Globus: This component includes a Policy Decision Point (PDP) for web 
services in Globus such as WS-GRAM and RFT. This PDP makes authorization decisions 
based on Shibboleth attributes. At the current state this functionality is limited to “Yes-or-
No” decisions. It is e.g. not possible to choose a specific batch queue based on Shibboleth 
attributes. The PDP does also contain an interface to query these attributes directly from 
an IdP. This implies the aforementioned IdP discovery problem. Evaluation of pushed 
attributes is planned for the near future but not yet available. Furthermore it is not yet 
 
Figure 1: Components of the GridShib architecture with current version numbers 
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possible to make authorization decisions solely based upon Shibboleth attributes: As there 
is no concept in the Globus Toolkit similar to gLite’s pool-accounts there is still need for a 
one-to-one mapping of Grid identities to local accounts. The grid-mapfile must thus still 
be present and contain the DNs of all authorized users. 
• GridShib for Shibboleth: This component has to be installed together with the IdPs if 
attribute pull on the Grid resources is used. As the SAML assertion identifying the user is 
not present on the Grid resources (only the user’s DN from his credentials is available), it 
is not possible for these Grid resources to query the IdP directly. GridShib for Shibboleth 
fills this gap and serves as the glue between the Grid services and the Shibboleth IdP 
software. 
• GridShib CA: This component is a Shibboleth Service Provider (SP) used to issue a short 
lived certificate (SLC), which the user uses instead of proxy certificates derived from a 
long-lived user certificate. A service issuing SLCs is called a short-lived certificate 
service (SLCS). The user needs to authenticate to the SLCS, e.g. by username/password or 
a user certificate imported into the web browser. If the SLCS is realized in form of a 
Shibboleth SP, authentication is handled by Shibboleth mechanisms described in this 
document. 
• GridShib SAML Tools: These tools can be used to request SAML assertions from a 
SAML Attribute Authority (such as an IdP) and optionally bind them to a X.509 proxy 
certificate. Using these tools it will be possible to push attributes within such a proxy 
certificate to the Grid resources. This solves the IdP discovery problem and eliminates the 
need to install the GridShib for Shibboleth software on the IdPs. 
 
In Figure 2 the complete process of acquiring a credential and submitting a Globus job using 
attribute pull is illustrated. The steps with a black circle require user interaction whereas the ones 
without are executed automatically. The steps are in detail: 
1. The user accesses the web front end of the GridShib CA in order to request a SLC. 
2. The SLC forwards the user to the federation’s WAYF. 
3. The user selects his home organization’s IdP from a list of all available IdPs of the 
federation. 
4. The WAYF forwards the user to the chosen IdP. 
 
Figure 2:  GridShib workflow using SLCS [GridShib] 
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5. The user enters his username/password combination or authenticates himself by other 
means. 
6. The IdP compares the user’s credential with its Identity Management (IdM) system, e.g. 
an LDAP server. The user’s attributes are also retrieved from this database. 
7. The IdP issues a cookie to the user’s web browser and forwards the user back to the SP he 
originally tried to access. 
8. By accessing the cookie issued by the IdP and information embedded into the URL the 
IdP forwarded the client to, the Shibboleth SP protecting the GridShib CA can evaluate 
the user’s authentication information. On the user’s computer a Java WebStart application 
is launched which creates a key pair and sends a certificate request to the GridShib CA. 
9. If the GridShib CA uses MyProxy as backend for signing certificate requests, it forwards 
the user’s request to the MyProxy service. Alternatively the GridShib CA can use the 
OpenSSL libraries to sign certificate requests. 
10. The user receives a SLC that, together with its associated private key, can now be used 
like a normal proxy credential known from the standard Grid Security Infrastructure 
(GSI) used by both gLite and the Globus Toolkit. The Java WebStart application stores 
the SLC and the private key in /tmp/x509_u<UID> as grid-proxy-init does with proxy 
credentials. 
11. The user issues a Grid job using globusrun-ws just like he would do with normal proxy 
credentials. 
12. Optional: If attribute pull is used and the SP knows which IdP to ask it is possible to pull 
further attributes from the user’s IdP, e.g. VO membership information. 
13. The result of the job submission is returned to the user. 
GridShib introduces several features to Grid computing, depending on which components are used. 
(e.g., the Shibboleth PDP for Globus can be used independently from the GridShib CA and vice 
versa). 
5.2 Evaluation 
Using Shibboleth attributes for making authorization decisions on Grid resources will only be 
useful if complete user coverage in the grid-mapfile can be avoided. At the moment this is not 
possible because the mapping of the user to a local account is done by a static one-to-one mapping 
using the user’s DN. Other possible advantages, such as enqueueing “premium users” to express 
queues, are at this point not available. The Globus Toolkit developers are in the process of 
implementing pool accounts similar to those used in gLite, but despite the current lack of software 
support many resource owners dislike the idea of pool accounts because of accounting and tracking 
issues caused by the lack of separation of users. 
The advantage of the GridShib CA is that users do not need long running user certificates issued by 
a CA any more. If certificate handling and key hygiene on the user’s end is considered a critical 
issue, the use of a GridShib CA is a viable solution. As the user still needs to authenticate to his 
home organization’s IdP by some means it is still required that the user has some sort of credential, 
currently this means a username/password combination. Another open issue is the creation of the 
DN of the created SLC: First of all the creation needs to be consistent, i.e. a user must always 
receive SLCs with the same DN. As the DN is composed of one or more entries, such as Country 
(C), Organization (O), Organizational Unit (OU) and Common Name (CN), it has to be agreed 
upon a scheme how to create these entries. The CN will most probably be derived from an attribute 
issued by the user’s IdP, e.g. the eduPersonPrincipalName attribute taken from the 
eduPerson [EduPerson] scheme, which is a common standard for Shibboleth attributes. At the 
moment, the GridShib CA statically generates the O and OU entries. It would be better to handle 
them in a more flexible way, e.g. by using an eduPersonScopedAffiliation attribute or 
the user’s home organization identified by his IdP for the OU. 
Although GridShib is mainly focused on the Globus Toolkit, it can easily be integrated with gLite’s 
VOMS, as it is possible to embed a VOMS attribute certificate into a proxy certificate derived from 
an SLC issued by a GridShib CA by using the existing voms-proxy-init command, i.e. no new 
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software needs to be developed or adapted to allow this. If the Grid resources know the GridShib 
CA certificate as a trusted CA, all SLCs issued by it will be accepted and the existing DN- or 
attribute-based authorization process will be used. A possible integration with UNICORE will be 
evaluated by IVOM. 
From an IVOM point of view, GridShib can be used on the one hand to leverage AA-
Infrastructures currently being implemented by DFN. Additionally DFN is currently implementing 
a GridShib CA which is planned to be accredited by the EUGridPMA as soon as possible. As DFN 
is already active as a Grid CA and is evaluating authoritative policies [EGP] for SLCSs currently 
being worked out by the American TAGPMA [Gen05], it is advisable to use this infrastructure in a 
D-Grid AA-Infrastructure. 
The GridShib for Globus package is needed if Shibboleth attributes, either pushed or pulled, are to 
be used for authorization decisions on Grid resources. When, in the future, more fine grained 
authorization decisions will be possible by evaluating attributes other than the user’s DN and the 
need for fully-fledged grid-mapfiles will cease, a PDP evaluating these attributes is needed. In case 
of Shibboleth attributes this PDP will be GridShib for Globus. 
GridShib for Shibboleth is from a current point of view not as valuable: The GridShib for 
Shibboleth package is needed only when Grid resources pull attributes directly from an IdP. As 
there is no easy solution for the IdP discovery problem, in the future attribute push will be the 
method of choice, thus rendering GridShib for Shibboleth superfluous. Furthermore, as IdPs in 
generic AAIs, like the DFN-AAI, will be operated by Grid-independent organizations it might not 
always be possible to add this functionality to the IdPs. 
 
6 PERMIS  
PERMIS [PERMIS] is a policy based authorization system (PMI - Privilege Management 
Infrastructure) being developed at the University of Kent (UK), which uses credentials such as 
X.509 attribute certificates stored in an LDAP directory to hold roles/attributes. Given a username, 
a resource and an action, it says whether the user is granted or denied access based on the policy for 
the resource. A core component of PERMIS is to provide a Policy Decision Point (PDP) 
functionality, another core component is the credential validation service (CVS) which is similar to 
a Policy Information Point (PIP). 
Although PERMIS can be used in a variety of modes, the focus in this IVOM evaluation lies on its 
use together with Globus Toolkit and Shibboleth / GridShib. Thus the text first describes 
authorization in Globus Toolkit and in GridShib, where authentication and authorization is based 
on the Internet2-software Shibboleth, which is based on the OASIS standard SAML. Where 
appropriate the text refers to parallel sections within this document. 
 
6.1 Background: Authorization in Globus Toolkit 
In this section we will introduce the GridShib project from an authorization point of view, 
preparing for an understanding of the PERMIS and GridShibPERMIS projects. Before we describe 
the authorization part of GridShib, the reader is referred to the sections describing authorization in 
the Globus Toolkit itself (following hereafter) and in Shibboleth (SAML and Shibboleth). 
6.1.1 Authorization in Globus Toolkit 
Authorization is the process of deciding whether an entity, e.g. a user, is entitled to perform a 
certain action on a certain target. In the Globus Toolkit framework, in its newest version 4, a 
powerful and flexible authorization framework has been established [FA05, SW06]. Within this 
framework, an incoming authorization request will be processed by a chain of modules called 
interceptors (see also Figure 3). There are two basic types of interceptors: 
• A Policy Information Point (PIP) queries suitable sources of information for attributes related 
to the initial request. Attributes can be a user's affiliation, some entitlement statement or just 
information about the user's request under consideration. The source can be external 
information, such as a directory, or information the client supplies with its request, such as 
SAML attribute assertions or X.509 Attribute Certificates. The attribute information will be 
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extracted from the medium that stored or transported it and normalized into a technology-
neutral format ready for further processing. There can be multiple PIPs each adding 
information to the attribute store relating to the request. 
 
Figure 3: GT4 Authorization Architecture [CNO06] 
• A Policy Decision Point (PDP) uses the supplied attributes to make a Deny/Permit decision for 
the request. There can be multiple PDPs each processing its set of attributes and each returning 
its decision. As of GT version 4.0.x, the answers of all PDPs are chained by the authorization 
engine using AND logic (deny overrides), which means that if a Deny decision is returned by 
any one of the PDPs in the chain, the request is denied.  
• The Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) is actually not an interceptor but can be seen as the GT 
Engine itself. It is responsible for enforcing the final decision of the authorization engine. Only 
if that returned Permit, the requested action will be performed on the requested target and the 
result returned to the requester. 
6.1.2 Authorization with GridShib 
The four components of GridShib (GridShib for Globus, for Shibboleth, CA, and SAML tools, cf. 
chapter Globus Toolkit and Shibboleth: GridShib) can be used mainly independently of each other. 
For example, the CA will be very useful for authentication of new grid users not possessing grid 
certificates. A complete scenario of the CA usage can be found in chapter Globus Toolkit and 
Shibboleth: GridShib.  
 
Figure 4: Classic GridShib pull profile 
Here we will be more concerned with the combination of the GridShib for Shibboleth and GridShib 
for GT plugins from an authorization point of view. It is assumed that the user is in possession of a 
personal X509 certificate. Then GridShib leverages the existing authentication mechanisms in GT 
and provides attribute-based authorization by using the Shibboleth mechanism. A possible 
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workflow (Classic GridShib profile, see [Scav06c]) using attribute pull can be found in Figure 4.  
0. Beforehand, a mapping from RFC2253 DNs to local principal names must have been 
established. This is done once at the IdP, either via one or more name-mapping-files 
(similar to GT's grid-map-file) or via a relational Database supporting the JDBC interface. 
For the latter, GridShib supplies a Certificate Registry servlet where users can register and 
unregister their X.509 certificates which eventually get stored in the database.  
1. The Grid Client requests a service at the Grid SP. At the same time, it will present an 
X.509 (proxy) certificate and provide a pointer to its preferred IdP (IdP discovery 
problem). The latter is currently hard-wired in the Grid SP. 
2. The Grid SP authenticates the Client and extracts the DN from the proxy certificate. The 
Grid SP queries the Attribute Authority (AA) at the IdP using the DN as a SAML name 
identifier. 
3. At the Attribute Authority of the IdP, the requester will be authenticated by mapping the 
DN to a local principal name. Then the AA returns an attribute assertion to the Grid SP. 
4. Finally, the Grid SP parses the assertion and performs the requested service, returning a 
response to the Grid Client. 
Complementing the above workflow, there are several possibilities to integrate the GridShib 
Certificate Authority (back-ended by Myproxy) which will issue short-lived certificates (SLCs) for 
new Grid users into the authorization chain (cf. [Scav06c]): 
• Myproxy-first with Attribute Pull: here the Online CA back-ended by MyProxy will insert a 
SAML authN assertion into a short-lived, reusable end-entity certificate, before the workflow 
follows the setup in Figure 4. 
• IdP-first Attribute Pull: Here the client will first authenticate at their home IdP which will issue 
a SAML authN assertion. MyProxy then consumes the authN assertion from the IdP, inserts a 
SLC and produces another SAML AuthN assertion.  
• IdP-first Attribute Push: Here MyProxy consumes both authN and authZ assertions issued by 
the IdP and produces both assertions including the SLC. In contrast to Attribute Pull, the Grid 
SP will not ask for attributes at the IdP but expects them in the SAML assertion it receives. 
• Browser profiles, such as IdP-first Attribute Pull (where the normal Shibboleth profile is used), 
but extendend: the SP protects a web version of MyProxy, and control then proceeds to the 
Grid SP which pulls attributes from the IdP and returns the result via the Shibboleth SP 
To summarize, GridShib can be used in various ways to account for several possibilities of 
authorization in the Grid context using Shibboleth. However, there are still some problems. One is 
that GridShib is not enough: usually, federation IdPs do not store grid-related attributes needed for 
authorization. IdP proxies such as myVocs can fill this gap. Another example is attribute 
aggregation, which is possible in the new GT AuthZ framework by parallelizing several PIPs, but 
is presently not implemented in GridShib. 
As outlined in [CNO06], the GridShib PDP has a number of shortcomings which PERMIS 
promises to remedy. The GridShib PDP makes authorization decisions by comparing the received 
attributes to an access control list (ACL) that contains allowed attributes. This leads to users being 
granted access if they have any single attribute in the ACL. Combinations of attributes (e.g. 
member of University X and project Y) or dynamically changing conditions (e.g. time of day, 
amount of consumed resources) can not be accounted for. Likewise, parameters of the user's 
request are not recognized, such as the operation, the requested target or the job priority. 
Furthermore, GridShib is not able to verify whether the IdP issued the correct set of attributes that 
it was trusted to issue, i.e. there is no possibility to write something like a policy stating who is 
entitled to issue which attributes to whom. 
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PERMIS [PERMIS] (PrivilEge and Role Management Infrastructure Standards Validation) is a 
solution for policy-based authorization; it thus only complements existing authentication solutions. 
The following overview is in large parts quoting [PERMIS] without indicating this separately. 
PERMIS is an infrastructure that provides the necessary facilities for users to manage privileges 
and authorization policies and for applications to make authorization decisions. 
• The Attribute Certificate Manager is provided for privilege management and the Bulk Loader 
for managers to allocate privilege to users. The generated privilege information is stored in 
X.509 Attribute Certificate format. PERMIS also provides the Delegation Issuing Service, 
which allows users to delegate (a subset of) their privileges to other users in their domain, 
according to the site's delegation policy. 
• The Policy Editor is provided for policy management to allow administrators to construct 
authorization policies for their applications and delegation policies for their Delegation Issuing 
Service. The policies are created in XML format, and may then be optionally protected by 
encapsulating them in an X.509 policy attribute certificate, digitally signed by the 
administrator.  
• For authorization decision making, PERMIS provides a modular policy decision point (PDP) 
and a credential validation service (CVS).  
1. The credential validation service is used to validate whether the allocation of 
privileges is valid or not. (The need for this is due to the fact that privileges may be 
managed in a distributed manner, thus potentially anybody can allocate any privileges 
to anyone else, but only some of these allocations will be recognised by the PERMIS 
CVS as being valid). The CVS is a core component that will be integrated with 
applications, and it returns the set of valid attributes for a user, ready for the PDP to 
make an authorization decision.  
2. The policy decision point renders an authorization decision for a user's access 
request, normally in the form of grant or deny. The PDP is a core component that will 
be integrated with applications, and it is responsible for making the authorization 
decisions when applications need to verify whether a requested operation is 
authorized or not. The application is responsible for enforcing the decisions returned 
from the PDP.  
PERMIS is based on the following concepts and technologies: 
1. Role Based Access Control (RBAC). RBAC allows grouping all users into roles (or 
attributes), each role/attribute is associated with a collection of privileges. A user's 
membership of a role will allow the user to exercise the privileges associated with the role. 
Roles in PERMIS can be organized into hierarchies with superior roles inheriting the 
privileges of subordinate ones. Below we outline which parts of the RBAC standard 
[RBAC04] are supported by PERMIS. 
2. Policy based Management. Authorization criteria are specified as a collection of rules, 
and these rules are stored as a policy. The policy is then used by the PERMIS PDP when it 
renders authorization decisions and by the PERMIS CVS when it returns the valid sets of 
user attributes. In this way, PERMIS is not hard coded with the authorization rules. 
Administrators can change the policy for an application, which in turn will change 
PERMIS's authorization decision results. Changing policies will not require any change of 
the applications' implementation or any recompiling of the application's code.  
Other related technologies are: 
3. XACML. (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) - this XML schema (an OASIS 
standard) allows for representation and processing of authorization policies. The XACML 
interface has been introduced recently into the ensemble of supported technologies in 
PERMIS. This way the PERMIS CVS can interact either with the PERMIS PDP or 
another XACML-compliant PDP, e.g. SUNs XACML PDP. 
4. LDAP. LDAP is used by PERMIS as a network accessible repository for storing policies 
and credentials. LDAP support is optional in modular PERMIS, as the system can use 
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other repositories such as local file stores. A new WebDAV repository is currently being 
tested by the University of Kent that will store X.509 certificates (PKCs, and ACs) in 
Apache web servers, accessible via the HTTP protocol. PERMIS also allows programmers 
to extend the capabilities of PERMIS to access other repositories such as databases, web 
pages, etc.  
5. X.509 Attribute Certificates. X.509 Attribute Certificates were compulsory in early 
versions of PERMIS, to provide trust and tamper-proof resistance to policies and 
credentials. In the current version of PERMIS, X.509 attribute certificates are no longer 
compulsory, as other formats are supported, including plain XML policies and SAML 
attribute assertions. PERMIS also allows programmers to extend the capabilities of 
PERMIS to access other formats for credentials and policies.  
The underlying architecture of PERMIS is a distributed architecture. Normally the following 
principals/entities will be involved: 
1. System Administrators (called Sources of Authority in PERMIS). System 
administrators are principals responsible for composing the rules for the decision making 
and credential validation services. These rules are kept as policies. The rules for decision 
making specify the association of privileges to roles/attributes, saying what privileges 
have been assigned to every role/attribute in the system. The rules for credential validation 
specify the way that PERMIS recognizes valid Attribute Administrators and valid 
credentials that they have issued, as credentials may be issued by many parties that are not 
trusted by the system administrators in the current domain.  
2. Attribute Administrators (or Attribute Authorities). Attribute administrators (AAs) 
issue attributes to users. These attributes are normally used to associate users with roles. 
Thus with the issued attributes, PERMIS can know what roles a user has been assigned to. 
Attributes will be managed in the form of credentials. These are the user-role assignment 
rules of RBAC. 
3. Users. Users are the principals that perform operations on the protected resources. Users 
can be human beings or applications.  
4. Applications. Applications are the programs that do useful things for users and provide 
users with interfaces to access protected resources. Applications will need to intercept the 
users' request to access protected resources, and solicit authorization decisions from 
PERMIS. The application will then need to enforce the authorization decisions returned by 
PERMIS. This enforcement is normally to reject the user's request to access the resource if 
the authorization decision is "denied" and to allow access to the resource if the decision is 
"granted".  
5. Resources. Resources are valuable computer based resources that need to be protected 
from being wasted, damaged or used improperly by users.  
To summarize, system administrators will write authorization policies, specifying what roles have 
which privileges, and what kind of credentials will be recognized by PERMIS. The authorization 
policy will be used by PERMIS for all reasoning regarding authorization. Attribute administrators 
will issue credentials to users containing attributes, telling what roles the users have. When a user 
requests access to a protected resource, the user's credentials will be analyzed by PERMIS, and 
only those attributes that can be validated by the credential validation rules in the policy will be 
recognized as valid by PERMIS. Then PERMIS will use the association of attributes and privileges 
as specified in the policy to render an authorization decision for the user's request. 
There is a project within the PERMIS framework called SimplePERMIS. SimplePERMIS 
represents the core of the PERMIS decision engine. It provides the core access control service (i.e. 
access control decision-making). It works in push mode only and the policy is stored in a plain 
XML file. It does not support X.509 attribute certificates, or LDAP directories. It can be considered 
as a lightweight PERMIS decision engine with the decoupling of credential validation and policy 
protection implementations. 
6.2.2 Evaluation 
A major advantage of the PERMIS tools is its distributed privilege management, i.e. the possibility 
to distribute the responsibilities across many domains. On the service provider side, this concerns 
the target SOA (Source of Authority) which creates the target access policy (TAP) and the subject 
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SOA which is responsible for the role assignment policy (RAP). The identity providers in turn each 
are responsible for allocation of attributes/roles to their users. 
For a functioning PERMIS system, the following ingredients are needed: 
• An LDAP server for storing the TAP and RAP policy (alternatively the policy can be stored in 
the file system) 
• The policy formulated in XML, possibly created using the Policy Editor 
• A certificate in .PKCS#12 format (that contains user and CA certificates as well as the users 
private key) to sign the policy 
• A SOA (along with its DN) which is entitled to create the policy 
• An LDAP directory to store user names and roles 
• The above data are needed to configure the PERMIS engine. Additionally for each decision, 
the (Simple-)PERMIS engine needs the following arguments: 
• a user's DN, 
• the DN or URL of the target 
• and an action to be executed on the target. 
In its first versions, PERMIS only implemented hierarchical RBAC (RBAC1) allowing inheritance 
of attributes. Permissions are not tied to users. However, the RBAC standard [RBAC04] allows a 
more fine-grained model including separation of duties (RBAC2) and other features. Moving 
towards the standard, RBAC2 recently has been implemented with PERMIS, details of which can 
be found in [CXO+07]. 
The most critical question for IVOM with respect to PERMIS is the question of licensing. Most 
PERMIS tools (except SimplePermis and SAWS, the Secure Audit Log Web Service) use the 
Stiftung SIC IAIK JCE library for signing X.509 attribute certificates. This library is licensed for 
educational and research use and evaluation only. Production and commercial use of the software is 
not covered by these terms (see http://jcewww.iaik.at/sales/licences/). There have 
been efforts to replace the IAIK library with Bouncy Castle as part of integrating PERMIS with 
OMII-UK. As of  May 2007, development of this replacement has been completed and it will have 
to be re-evaluated at a later stage once all tests have been finished. . Additionally, the PERMIS 
binary downloads contain a similar license which requires to „use the software solely for the 
purposes of academic research and teaching“. However, most of the PERMIS source code has 
been released to the public recently and is now available under the name of OpenPERMIS with a 
BSD-like license. While this has eased the licensing problems, it has at the same time complicated 
the installation of PERMIS as the downloads solely contain the bare source code – without required 
libraries, without ant build files, without installation documentation etc.; the issue with the IAIK 
JCE library still remains as well. 
6.3 GridShibPERMIS 
6.3.1 Overview 
In what follows we introduce the integration of GridShib with PERMIS. GridShibPERMIS was a 
third-year student research project carried out by Andrey Novikov and supervised by David 
Chadwick (the inventor of PERMIS) and Alexander Otenko, funded by UK JISC. Basically, the 
Globus Toolkit authorization chain was extended by a custom PDP (the GridShibPERMIS Context 
Handler) which interfaces to the PERMIS engine. Figure 5 can be consulted to gain an overview of 
the GridShibPermis architecture, which we describe in turn, cf. [CNO06]. 
Like in the classic GridShib profile, the user first authenticates using her long- or short-lived 
credential. Authentication could be realized by the GridShib SAML authentication PIP or some 
other means, but this will not be covered here. The according DN of the authenticated user is then 
extracted by the GridShib SAML Attribute PIP. The PIP uses the DN to request attributes at the 
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Attribute Authority of the Shibboleth Identity Provider, which will leverage the GridShib IdP 
name-mapping plug-in to resolve the DN into a local principal name. The Attribute Authority will 
then query the IdP's directory, e.g. an LDAP server, for this principal's attributes. In the case of 
PERMIS, this must include any information about this user's roles. As roles can be stored as 
attributes, this is compatible with directory services such as LDAP. The role information will then 
be returned in a SAML attribute assertion as in the standard GridShib case to the GridShib PIP. 
 
Figure 5: GridShibPERMIS integration scheme [CNO06] 
The GridShib PIP will receive the SAML assertions. It parses them and converts the included 
attribute information into a plain Java object, which will be used further on. Next this information 
will be fed into the GridShibPermis Context Handler, which is the heart of the GridShibPermis 
project. It functions as a PDP in the Globus Toolkit authorization framework, extracting the 
attributes returned by the GridShib PIP. They will be converted into the internal Java format 
recognized by the PERMIS API. According to the PERMIS policy used, Permis' Credential 
Validation Service (CVS) will check whether the IdP is trusted and entitled to issue the attributes it 
has returned. In order to do this, either an LDAP directory or a local file will be queried for the 
policy to be applied. Next the PERMIS PDP proper is called and handed over the valid attributes 
together with the user's requested action and target. It is here where an access control decision is 
made according to the PERMIS policy in effect. The decision is returned to the GridShibPermis 
Context Handler which in turn hands it over to the Globus Toolkit PEP which is responsible for 
enforcing the decision. 
An attempt is made to support the distributed management of attributes by allowing scoped 
domains as known from Shibboleth. When the PERMIS CVS is passed scoped attributes, the scope 
domains take the place of the Source of Authority (Subject SOA, i.e. the signer of the AC). The 
PERMIS role allocation policy specifies the scope domains as SOAs in place of attribute certificate 
issuers. If an origin site does not issue scoped attributes, the name of the origin site will be inserted 
as scope domain for all attributes, but only if its name is configured into the GridShib PIP's SAML 
metadata. This solution is very constraining as it allows only for a single origin site. 
6.3.2 Evaluation 
An advantage of GridShibPERMIS over plain PERMIS is that the licensing problems with the 
IAIK JCE library are less of an issue. This is because GridShib does not use X.509 attribute 
certificates but encodes its attributes in SAML. Consequently, the library that would handle ACs is 
not needed. However, this library is also used to sign the policies and store them in ACs. This 
means that GridShibPERMIS would have to work with unsigned policies. As described in [Nov06], 
omission of the IAIK library also resolves a compatibility problem the IAIK library had with the 
Claymore SSL Toolkit used by Globus and GridShib. 
There are a number of issues in which GridShibPERMIS does not differ from plain GridShib. First, 
we have the IdP discovery problem. This is currently solved, as in GridShib, by hard-coding the 
preferred IdP into the GridShib PIP. Once the Globus team solves this it will be solved for 
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GridShibPERMIS as well. Second, the Shibboleth IdP has to maintain information about user's 
roles in its attributes which has to be in synchronization with the attributes/roles expected by the 
SP/PDP. Third, according to [CNO06], there is no possibility yet to use pseudonymous access in 
GridShibPERMIS as both the user's DN and attributes will be revealed to the grid application. 
Fourth, according to [Nov06], there is no possibility to merge attributes from multiple AAs and use 
those for the PERMIS decisions. However again, this is a GridShib issue as PERMIS itself can 
merge automatically from multiple IdPs by users' LDAP DNs. 
By the time of writing this report (March 2007), it turned out that the current release of GridShib 
(0.5.1) had changed several names of Java classes compared to GridShib 0.4.0 which the original 
GridShibPERMIS project was based on. This meant that an error would be generated whenever 
these methods were called, resulting in failure of the whole GridShibPERMIS system. We thank 
the whole PERMIS team and especially David Chadwick and George Inman for tracking and fixing 
this issue. This part of the present report was written in close contact with them. 
Another question in the IVOM context would be whether there is, besides Globus' GridShib, also 
an integration of PERMIS with gLite or UNICORE available. As for gLite, it might be included in 
a currently new project to integrate PERMIS and VOMS with GT4, OMII-UK and GT2. It will be 
using VOMS as an attribute authority and PERMIS as a decision engine. (See [VPMan]). 
UNICORE integration is not planned. 
PERMIS also has the SAAM module which allows Shibboleth-enabled authorization for Apache- 
controlled websites. The DyVOSE project [DyVOSE] developed an extension to PERMIS for 
dynamic delegation of authority and pushing out ACs for use in VOs. An approach similar to 
PERMIS but for Grid portals is currently being developed as part of the OMII-SP project [OMII-
SP]. 
7 MAMS’ VO-related Work  
7.1 MAMS Project Overview 
MAMS was initiated in 2003 as a three-year project to integrate „multiple solutions to managing 
authentication, authorization and identities, together with common services for digital rights, search 
services and metadata management“, locally within organizations and inter-institutional. The 
project’s objective was to provide „an essential middleware” component to increase the efficiency 
and effectiveness of Australia’s higher education research infrastructure“ [MAMS]. 
To achieve this, MAMS aims to produce integrated solutions to identity, authentication, and 
authorization management, together with common services for digital rights, search services and 
metadata management, for users in mutual trusted organizations to share protected resources and 
services.  
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Figure 6: MAMS project timeline [VuDa05] 
MAMS was a middleware project that developed a technical infrastructure for institutions to share 
content and resources in a trusted environment. It had no specific objectives in the field of grid 
computing (see Figure 6). Though, during the course of the project, work and concepts included 
grid aspects. MAMS conducted research and development work in the following fields: 
• Federated identity and access management 
• Federated search 
• Customization of applications for use with Shibboleth (GridSphere, DSpace, Fedora etc.) 
• Open Access 
• Access Control with XACML 
MAMS decided early to rely on Shibboleth [Shib] as authentication and authorization 
infrastructure. Therefore the project initiated the Australian AAI federation and provided the 
required resources. It contributed ShARPE, the Shibboleth Attribute Release Policy Editor 
[ShARPE], and Autograph, which enables personal control on Shibboleth attribute release 
[Autograph], to the Shibboleth community. These components will be included in future 
Shibboleth releases. 
7.2 MAMS’ definition of VO 
MAMS has a broad understanding of the term virtual organization (VO). It follows the VO 
definition of T. Dimitrakos, D. Golby and P. Kearney [DGK04]: 
„ A Virtual Organisation is  understood as a temporary or permanent coalition of 
geographically dispersed individuals,  groups, organisational units or entire organisations 
that pool resources, capabilities and information to achieve common objectives. Virtual 
Organisations can provide services and thus participate as a single entity in the formation of 
further Virtual Organisations.“ 
 
In general, scientific projects, work groups and other inter-institutional collaborations are seen as 
virtual organizations. MAMS´ goal is to provide a appropriate VO infrastructure to allow for: 
• Collaboration between project members, 
• Collaboration with externals, 
• Dissemination of research results, 
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• Authentication and authorization based on Shibboleth. 
The VO is seen at the core of a general collaboration platform for eScience, which should provide 
for the same tools and technologies real organizations use: calendars, forums, wikis,  grids, 
repositories, to name a few. 
Product Full Name Type  Release  Availability Documentation 
ShibGS Shibbolized 
GridSphere 









toolkit, based on a VO 
management 
component  
Prototype Online Test Architecture, 
Functionality 
Table 1: State of VO-related work at MAMS (as of February 2007) 
7.3 ShibGS: Shibboleth-enabled GridSphere 
To develop a VO management system was a major work item in MAMS from start on. As there 
was no Shibboleth-based system available they started to build the required features into 
GridSphere [GS]. GridSphere was selected for being Open Source Software with access to the 
source code, for its JSR168 compliance, its integrated user management and its existing range of 
portlets. 
MAMS released this product as ShibGS [ShibGS], a GridSphere plugin that enabled Shibboleth-
based authentication. ShibGS is not a VO management system. It is included in this study as it is 
the only openly available product reviewed here. 
7.4 IAMSuite 
In February 2006, the MAMS team started to develop an ambitious toolkit for the Australian 
eReseach middleware infrastructure: The Identity and Access Management (IAM) Suite 
[IAMSuite]. On the base of secure portal-based VO infrastructure it shall integrate the Shibboleth 
and PKI AAI frameworks to support access to common Internet services, such as portals, 
repositories, Wikis etc., as well as access to Grid services, including Grid storage facilities (e. g. 
Storage Resource Broker) and high performance computing. Additionally, the IAM Suite serves as 
a general IT infrastructure toolkit for the management of projects, groups and workspaces, 
providing for easy set-up and access to collaboration tools like a CMS, calendar, Wiki, forum, 
mailing lists. This enhances research effectiveness for projects, especially those funded for short 
durations, by saving time to get the project IT infrastructure going. The conceptual model 
underlying the IAMSuite system is called the Trust Virtual Organization (TVO). 
With the IAM Suite MAMS proposes to organize existing services in three layers (see Figure 7): 
Layer 1: The Federation Services layer contains standard services for the Australian 
federation, including a WAYF service. Additionally, a Shibboleth-protected MyProxy server 
shall provide for conversion of a user’s SAML assertion into a short-lived proxy certificate, 
giving the user access to grid facilities based on Globus Toolkit [GTK]. MAMS also 
developed a federation gateway called VO-WAYF to support cross-federation authentication 
and authorization (not shown in Figure 7: IAM Suite architecture). 
Layer 2: Institutional Identity and Service Providers constitute the Institutions layer. These 
are the federation members. 
Layer 3: The eResearch Project or Virtual Organization layer contains the general IT 
infrastructure components required by an eResearch project. At the core is the IAMSuite. It is 
the main access point for project work: 
• On a user’s request being the switchboard to collect a SAML assertion from the 
institutional IdP, adding an own VO-specific SAML assertion and presenting it to a SP in 
the VO domain. 
• It is the Identity Provider for all the SPs in the VO domain. 
• It will provide a user with a proxy certificate from the Federation MyProxy server to 
access Grid/HPC services. 
• It contains a Group Manager to allow for VO administration. 
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Figure 7: IAM Suite architecture 
The IAM Suite shall enable eResearch projects to get an enriched SSO environment right out of the 
box. To allow for adaption to specific needs it will have a modular architecture [Vul06]. 
7.4.1 IAMSuite VO: The Trust Virtual Organization Model 
The IAMSuite VO is a VO management system based on the Trust Virtual Organization (TVO) 
conceptual model [IAMSuite]. The IAMSuite system provides a work „environment for 
geographically dispersed individuals, groups and organizational units to construct and maintain 
their temporary or permanent trust relationships and share disperse protected resources and services 
with SSO to achieve common goals“ [IAMSuite]. IAMSuite main concepts are: 
• Work space for VO members 
• Consistent sharing space for a collection of distributed resources and services 
• Trust bridge between IdPs and SPs across federations 
The IAMSuite system incorporates both Shibboleth communications entities; it is a service 
provider as well as a identity provider. The SP part comprises the GUI for VO administration and 
user self-service. It also collects the SAML assertion from the user’s home IdP during the user’s 
login.  
The outline of a typical IAMSuite workflow is shown in Figure 8 [VBD05]: 
 
Figure 8: MAMS VO authentication and authorization model [VBD05] 
 
1. The user tries to access a Grid service provider (SP). 
2. As the SP doesn’t know the user, she is redirected to the VO’s Where Are You From 
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(WAYF) service, which consists of a list of VO member institutions. Additionally, the 
WAYF creates a cookie and stores the desired SP’s address. 
3. She selects her institution’s Identity Provider, is redirected to the IdP, and provides the 
necessary login credentials. Typically, this could be a username and password, but could 
also be a PKI certificate provided by the institution’s helpdesk and signed with the 
institution’s key. 
4. The IdP validates the login credential, and the Attribute Authority uses the user’s Attribute 
Release Policy to determine which attributes should be sent to the VO, which is done 
accordingly using the SAML artifact method or the SAML post method. Additionally, the 
SAMLAuthenticationMethod variable is set to Software PKI (in case of PKI login) or 
Basic (in case of password login). 
5. The VO verifies the received SAML assertion (do we trust this institute, is the signature 
valid) and stores the received attributes in its own directory (this could be session based, 
or over a longer period according to the policies of the VO). Typically, those attributes 
should contain the personal attributes of the user, like full name, email address. Now, 
additional VO-specific attributes can be added to the authorization flow. 
6. The user is redirected again to the actual Service Provider (the SP’s address was stored by 
the WAYF in step 2) she wants to visit, accompanied by another SAML assertion 
generated by the VO’s IdP.  
 
Identity Providers  Servic e P roviders  
IA MS uite  Framew ork   
Goal -oriented W ork space  
Users/Groups  Services/Resources  
IdP  Management  SP  Management  
Trust Manage ment  
A PIs 
Trust -based A ccess 
Control  
LD AP  Content  
Repository  
 
Figure 9: IAMSuite implementation of the TVO model [IAMSuite] 
 
The IAMSuite is built on software from the Open Source projects Shibboleth (IdP and SP), 
MyProxy, OpenLDAP and Fedora, the OAI-compliant repository system. Figure 9 shows an 
architecture overview. The user and group management facilitates the life cycle (creation, 
modification, and deletion) of users or groups. It is based on the MAMS OpenIdP, which is a 
Shibboleth IdP connected to a LDAP server as user database. The Content Repository is based on 
the Shibboleth SP and Fedora to protect resources and services. Virtual Rooms serves as shared 
workspaces, in which users may collaboratively create, modify, and utilize protected resources and 
services. 
 
MAMS plans to provide an API to support developers in constructing IAMSuite-enabled 
applications in the fields of collaborative learning and e-Science or eResearch, respectively. 
 
7.5 A Review of MAMS’ VO-related Work 
A review of MAMS’ VO-related work can only in the case of ShibGS be based on practical 
product experience. The other products are not available yet. A prototype of IAMSuite with 
restricted access is available on-line. Therefore we review the latter based on the prototype and 
available documents. 
7.5.1 ShibGS 
The integration of Shibboleth authentication and authorization with the widely used Grid portal 
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software GridSphere was an intermediate step for MAMS. It facilitates the use of a JSR168 
compliant, rich Open Source portal software in a identity federation context. MAMS realized the 
integration by extracting common user attributes from the user’s SAML assertion and storing them 
in GridSphere’s user database.  
ShibGS is not a true plugin as it needs some modifications in GridSphere itself to work properly. 
This is due to the intervention into GridSphere’s user management. When a user logs in to ShibGS, 
he will be authenticated at his home IdP, then attributes, like the user id, surname, givename and 
mail address, will be requested from the user’s home IdP and stored in the portal’s user database. 
At each subsequent login, the user will be authenticated at his home IdP and, if needed, his 
attributes will be refreshed in GridSphere’s user database. 
A similar approach [WAJKS06] was chosen by the DyVOSE  (Dynamic Virtual Organization in e-
Science Education) project [DyVOSE], led by the National e-Science Centre, United Kingdom.  
ShibGS is supported by MAMS as a part of IAMSuite. Still, we see further need for Shibboleth-
based authentication and authorization being integrated in GridSphere and supported by the 
GridSphere development team. 
7.5.2 IAMSuite 
It is MAMS’ objective to build an integrated middleware component to support out-of-the-box 
proliferation of eResearch infrastructure. IAMSuite is the VO management component for this 
planned solution. For the time being, the direction MAMS has taken with IAMSuite is the only 
feasible, as is reflected by UAB’s myVocs [myVocs], which in general uses the same technique to 
realize VO management in Shibboleth. 
IAMSuite works as an IdP proxy between SPs outside IAMSuite and the federation IdPs. When a 
user logs in to IAMSuite, he will first be authenticated at his home IdP. During the authorization 
process the VO management extracts the user attributes from the home IdP’s assertion and stores it 
in a LDAP server as long as the session is active. When a user tries to access a SP outside 
IAMSuite during session lifetime, the user attributes will be released together with the VO 
attributes. The attributes are included in a single assertion, signed by the IAMSuite. This may lead 
to severe trust issues as we pointed out above (see Trust Issues above). MAMS is considering 
solving this problem in a future release. This trust problem does not affect the SPs that are closely 
integrated into the portal-based IAMSuite. Access to these services and resources is through the 
login to IAMSuite. 
IAMSuite – and myVocs – address the IdP Proxy problem (see Multiple VO Memberships above) 
by implementing the IdP proxy as a bridge between a federation of SPs – in myVocs they are called 
VO SPs – and the federation IdPs. This integration of SPs with the IdP proxy provides for the 
management of VOs at a single place. 
The IdP Proxy approach with its aggregation of SPs closely tied to the VO management is well 
suited for community Grids, where a proven trust fabric between providers and users is to be 
expected. However, with the further expansion of the Grid there is the need for further 
development to allow for the support of large-scale international projects with tens of thousands of 
members. 
With IAMSuite, the MAMS project has integrated the VO management into the GridSphere portal 
software. This moves the VO management close to the services and resources that may be included 
in the portal as portlets or otherwise. As access to these services and resources is not protected by 
separate Shibboleth SPs, there has to be a trustful relationship between those and the IAMSuite 
portal. 
7.5.3 Conclusion 
At the current stage of development, MAMS’ IAMSuite can not be recommended for use in D-
Grid. As of early 2007 it is available only as online demo. Also, trust issues regarding the 
combined release of IdP and VO attributes are not addressed in the current version of IAMSuite.  
The further development should be followed closely as the integration of VO management, 
repository systems, like Fedora or Storage Resource Broker, and Grid middleware is an interesting 
approach in the Australian e-Research context. 
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In must be emphasized that we continue to recommend other MAMS products, namely ShARPE, 
Autograph and ShibGS. Shibboleth-based authentication and authorization should be closely 
integrated into GridSphere and supported by the GridSphere development team. 
8 VOMS and VOMRS  
8.1 Short Description 
gLite’s Virtual Organization Membership Service (VOMS) [VOMS] and the Virtual Organization 
Membershib Registration Service (VOMRS) [VOMRS] developed by the VOX Project at Fermilab 
are both systems for managing members of VOs. The VOMRS user interface can be seen in Figure 
10: VOMRS  screenshot. The two systems have though a different focus and can be deployed 
individually or together as complementing systems. 
The features are in detail: 
Features VOMS and VOMRS have: 
• A database backend for storing the users and their attributes 
• Storing of VO-membership attributes as well as Group, Role and Capability attributes used by 
gLite’s LCAS mechanism for authorization decisions. 
• A web front-end for both users to register themselves and for VO-Administrators to manage 
the VO-members. 
VOMS-only features: 
• Web service based API to access the VO membership data 
• Issuing of attribute certificates for inclusion in proxy certificates 
VOMRS-only features: 
• A, compared to VOMS, more streamlined workflow for registering new users and 
administration of their attributes. This lessens the burden on VO administrators by, e.g., 
requiring new users to validate their e-mail addresses before their membership application is 
presented for approval to the responsible VO administrator. 
• Compulsory acceptance of an Acceptable Usage Policy (AUP). 
• Storage of additional user information such as telephone number and additional arbitrary 
attribute-value pairs 
• Forwarding of entered data to a complementing VOMS 
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Figure 10: VOMRS  screenshot 
8.2 Evaluation 
A standalone VOMRS without VOMS is useful if no attribute certificates need to be included in 
proxy certificates, e.g. in a Globus Toolkit-only environment. In this case, in order to use the stored 
data e.g. for creating grid-mapfiles, the information needs to be extracted by directly accessing the 
database as there is no API such as the one VOMS offers. 
A standalone VOMS does not offer the streamlined process of user registration and can thus 
impose a major burden on VO administrators. Furthermore it is not possible to store additional 
metadata about VO members, such as a telephone number. If such features are not needed but 
attribute certificates based on the VO membership data have to be issued, VOMS can be used 
standalone. 
As VOMRS is developed from the beginning with VOMS compatibility in mind, a combination of 
both services offers the combined features of both systems. It has to be considered that VOMRS 
must be used as the leading system as data migration only works in the direction from VOMRS to 
VOMS, not the other way round. If thus data is entered or altered directly in the VOMS, the two 
databases will become inconsistent. 
With regard to IVOM, it is advised to use both systems in conjunction: gLite requires a VOMS to 
issue attribute certificates and the streamlined registration process of VOMRS will ease the burden 
on VO administrators of large VOs. Furthermore current developments need to be assessed as 
current versions of VOMS are extended to be able to store arbitrary attribute-value pairs and a 
more streamlined registration process is planned for future releases. If future VOMS releases 
incorporate these features the advantages of adding VOMRS to VOMS might become less relevant. 
 
9 Virtual Organization Collaboration System (myVocs)  
9.1 A Short Description of myVocs 
9.1.1 myVocs’ Objectives 
myVocs’ design goal was to “extend the access to emerging Internet collaboration tools and build a 
system environment that respects VO defined roles and attributes while preserving valuable 
institutional identity assertions” [myVocs]. 
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myVocs thus manages attributes. It actually is a SAML-based Identity Provider proxy serving as a 
bridge between a federation of Shibboleth Identity Providers (IdP) and a federation of Shibboleth 
Service Providers (SP) (see Figure 11) for overcoming the somewhat unrealistic expectation that 
home organizations maintain their VO list of users. myVocs presents itself as a Shibboleth SP so 
that other services can rely on it to ensure that the user has been authenticated. The myVocs servers 
assert the attributes that the SPs in the VO need to base their authorization decisions upon.  
.  
Figure 11: myVocs as bridge [Scav06] 
 
myVocs allows several SPs (called VO SPs) to be aggregated into Virtual Organizations (VOs). 
myVocs considers VOs as people (more precisely: collections of attributes of people represented 
by lists), and the aggregated SPs as federated sets of distributed applications, the resources, 
accessible by this list of people. It is an important feature of myVocs that a single VO SP may 
serve multiple VOs and, hence, supporting overlapping VOs [Robi07]. 
Like the IdPs, the VO SPs may reside in arbitrary administrative domains. Using off-the-shelf, 
open source software components (such as Shibboleth, MySQL, and Sympa), myVocs provides the 
“glue” that authorizes access to a VO SP based on the membership in some specific VO. The 
resources are protected by VO SPs which are mutually trusted by a VO IdP. Figure 12 illustrates 
the orchestration of the various myVocs components during the process of authentication and 
authorization. 
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Figure 12: Typical myVocs workflow [Scav06] 
 
The outline of a typical myVocs workflow looks as follows: 
1. A browser client requests a VO web resource protected by a VO SP (e.g. a wiki or a listserv). 
If a security context for the principal (i.e. eduPersonPrincipal) already exists at the VO 
SP, skip to step 18. 
2. The client is redirected to the VO IdP (which is protected by a federation SP). 
3. The client makes a Shibboleth AuthnRequest (new in Shibboleth 1.3) to the VO IdP. If a 
security context for the principal already exists at the VO IdP, skip to step 12. 
4. The client is redirected to the federation IdP (ignoring a possible interaction with the 
federation WAYF). 
5. The client makes a second Shibboleth AuthnRequest to the SSO service at the federation IdP. 
If a security context for the principal does not exist at the federation IdP, the IdP identifies the 
principal (details omitted). 
6. The IdP updates security context for this principal, issues an authentication assertion, and 
returns an authentication response to the client. 
7. The client submits the authentication response to the assertion consumer service at the 
federation SP. The assertion consumer service validates the authentication assertion in the 
response and passes control to the attribute requester. 
8. The attribute requester queries the attribute authority at the federation IdP. 
9. The attribute authority returns an attribute response to the attribute requester. 
10. The federation SP updates its security context for this principal and redirects the client to the 
VO IdP. 
11. The client makes a Shibboleth AuthnRequest to the VO IdP, the same AuthnRequest made at 
step 3. 
12. The VO IdP filters the attributes from the header of the request (by virtue of the attribute 
exchange in steps 8 and 9), persists these attributes to the VO database (if necessary), and 
returns an authentication response to the client. 
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13. The client submits the authentication response to the assertion consumer service at the VO SP. 
The assertion consumer service validates the authentication assertion in the response and 
passes control to the attribute requester. 
14. The attribute requester queries the attribute authority at the VO IdP. 
15. The attribute authority returns an attribute response to the attribute requester. Both federation 
attributes (persisted at step 12) and VO attributes are included in the response. 
16. The VO SP updates its security context for this principal and redirects the client to the VO 
resource. 
17. The client requests the VO resource, the same request issued at step 1. 
18. The resource filters the attributes from the header of the request (by virtue of the attribute 
exchange in steps 14 and 15), makes an access control decision, and returns the resource to the 
client. 
9.1.2 The myVocs box 
The goal for myVocs box [myVocs] was to provide a framework for building federated system 
environments. In the case of distributed environments one of the strongest methods of binding 
systems together is by having a consistent definition of identity across the system. Essentially, the 
identity boundary defines the system boundary. Identities are the attributes that define users: 
username, email, and group memberships. The goal of the myVocs box is thus to support the 
definition and distribution of these identities that can then be available to all applications in the 
system environment, i.e. shared across Web-based and Grid-based applications.  
myVocs box essentially includes a VO attribute store (implemented as a relational data base)  that 
holds user groups and roles for the federated system environment. This attribute store is 
driven/controlled by the creation of mailing lists in the Sympa mailing list manager
2
. Although any 
attribute management system could be used, Sympa was selected by the developers simply as an 
easy tool to use that also provides a useful mailing list for VOs. The attributes can be distributed to 
applications via Shibboleth or GridShib for Web-based or Grid-based applications respectively. 
myVocs box is packaged as a virtual machine. The current version is 0.1 and it is thus very 
preliminary. It has been released on December 3
rd
 2006. It may be downloaded as tar-ball from 
http://myvocs-box.myvocs.org/downloads/myvocs-box-v0.1.tar.gz . The technologies in this 
release include:  
• A complete Shibboleth 1.3 identity system (IdP and SP) 
• Simple collaboration group setup and management via Sympa 
• Flexible resource integration powered by YubNub3 
• Dynamically allocated Drupal4, PHPwiki5, and WEBInsta FM6 collaboration tools 
• Globus integration powered by Gridshib CA and GridShib for Shibboleth 
• A short circuit identity provider for stand-alone operation.  
 
9.2 Installation of myVocs box in a Nutshell 
myVocs box comes as a ready to run virtual machine. If a VMware environment has already been 
established, myVocs box should be placed in the same directory as the other VMs and should be 
started from there. If such an environment is not yet available, the VMPlayer tool has to be 
installed first (available from http://www.vmware.com/products/player/ ). Using the VMPlayer 
myVocs box can be executed on the VMware provided NAT network. After having started it, the 
web browser needs to point to the box. This is accomplished by associating the host name myvocs-
box with the running box. To do this the IP address, the myVocs box is running on (printed on the 
VM console after the machine started up), needs to be inserted into /etc/hosts. After that the 
browser needs to point at http://myVocs-box.  
For testing myVocs box, the browser needs to trust myVocs box. This is achieved by clicking on 
the Trust Me link above the command prompt. Further usage and installation hints are given when 
using the Tools link. For “playing” with the tool: the root password is “root”, users can be created 
                                                           
2
  http://www.sympa.org  
3
  http://yubnub.org/  
4
  http://drupal.org/  
5
  http://phpwiki.sourceforge.net/  
6
  http://www.webinsta.com/fm.php  
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using the standard Linux commands after having “ssh”-ed to the box. 
We have setup myVocs box on an Intel Pentium 4 CPU, 3.00 GHz machine with 1 GB memory 
under Scientific Linux with kernel version 2.4.21-40.EL using Apache/1.3.33 (Debian GNU/Linux) 
PHP/4.3.10-18 mod_jk/1.2.5 mod_fastcgi/2.4.2 mod_ssl/2.8.22 OpenSSL/0.9.7e.  
9.3 Using myVocs Box 
Based on its background as collaboration system myVocs looks at VOs as collections of attributes 
associated to members of mailing lists and at VO resources as Web applications. Consequently 
myVocs provides commands for creating, maintaining, monitoring, and managing such lists (i.e. 
VOs).    
The commands which control myvocs-box are Web “commands” issued to the “command line” in 
Figure 13. These commands are conceptually similar to traditional unix commands but are simply 
expanded to HTTP GET or POST commands. 
  
Figure 13: myVocs entry screen 
As an example, newvo expands to the URL: 
http://myvocs-box/sympa/create_list_request?listname=%25shttp://myvocs-
box/sympa/create_list_request?listname=%25shttp://myvocs-
box/sympa/create_list_request?listname=%s, where %s is a placeholder for the argument passed to 
the newvo command. This interface to myVocs is implemented using YubNub. 
9.3.1 List of Commands 
As mentioned above, myVocs offers both a conceptual command line interface and a Web-based 
navigation. The commands are: 
• about: Some info about myVocs box 
• addnewuser: Add a new user to the designated VO 
• admin: Access the VO overview and member administration page 
• archive: Access the discussion archives of a project 
• book: Create a new book page in the project CMS 
• bookmark: Post a bookmark to del.icio.us 
• browse: Browse the existing virtual organizations 
• cms: Open the Content Management System (CMS) for the specified VO 
• create: Create new command 
• del: View the latest del.icio.us entries for the given tag 
• files: Browse the files available to the members of the VO 
• g: google 
• ge: Voted most popular commands 
• gim: Search google images 
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• gridlogin: Initialize grid credential for Globus using the myVocs-box instance of the 
GridShib CA 
• join: join a VO of the given name 
• ls: List all commands 
• most_used_commands: The most used commands 
• newblog: Bring up compose window for a new blog entry for the specified VO 
• newvo: Create a new virtual organization.  
• post: Send a message to the members of the VO 
• project: Find out about the myVocs-box project 
• tec: Search Technocrati 
• viewfile: view a file in the file manager for a VO 
• wiki: Open the wiki for the specified VO 
• wp: Search the Wikipedia encyclopedia with the specified keyword 
 
Due to myVocs’ understanding of VOs, creating a VO is simply creating a mailing list, assigning a 
subject to it and categorizing it. Members join the VO by subscribing to the list. Note that this 
understanding of VOs implies a separation of VO membership and VO ownership: the owner of a 
VO does not necessarily need to be a member of the list; she explicitly has to subscribe to the list. 
9.3.2 Web-Based Interface 
When using myVocs box through the Web interface the user will be navigating through several 
simple pages. Here are some examples: 
9.3.2.1 Selecting a VO resource 
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9.3.2.2 Selecting an Identity Provider 
 
 
9.3.2.3 Validating Identity 
 
 
9.4 Who Is Using or Considering myVocs? 
Currently the system is being used by the foundation of campus grid computing environment at the 
University of Alabama at Birmingham, USA. The Internet2 group is exploring VO management 
architectures to support user community and is considering myVocs for this. The Safari project of 
UK Data Archive
7
 is exploring myVocs for access authentication to resources. The collaboration 
with GridShib is ongoing. The Teragrid project is considering myVocs for user registration
8
. 
9.5 A Review of myVocs 
Focusing on attribute management within collaboration environments, myVocs allows for VOs 
based on Shibboleth identities. Users register via Shibboleth and can be added to myVocs-
                                                           
7
  http://safari.data-archive.ac.uk/  
8
  http://www-fp.mcs.anl.gov/tgmeeting/AAA-Agenda.htm and 
https://spaces.internet2.edu/display/GS/TeraGrid  
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maintained groups (in the form of mailing lists). myVocs acts as a Shibboleth proxy with a dual IdP 
and SP role to add group information to a user’s normal Shibboleth information. myVocs thus 
follows a similar approach as the Australian MAMS (see chapter MAMS’ VO-related Work).   
As per today (i.e. as per this version of myVocs) there are some issues with myVocs: 
• It is not clear which attributes need to be captured and persisted at step 12 in Figure 12. 
myVocs requires the federation IdP to release the attribute 
“eduPersonPrincipalName”, a globally unique identifier for the principal. This 
global identifier is permanently bound to a local identifier in the VO database. It is this 
binding that permits myVocs to determine the VO attributes associated with the user. 
The local identifier is determined as a result of a one-time registration step. At the time of 
registration, the user’s global identifier is bound to a local identifier in the VO database. 
As this is a kind of static approach, a more flexible registration process is required 
longterm. 
• In the architecture diagram (Figure 11), the myVocs SP relies on an ordinary WAYF for 
IdP discovery. In order to gain more flexibility (and some knowledge of a user’s history), 
myVocs proposes an enhanced IdP discovery process for myVocs based on the SAML 2.0 
IdP Discovery Profile, which allows SPs to more easily discover the user’s preferred IdP 
(see Figure 14). 
  
Figure 14: Enhanced IdP discovery [Scav06a] 
The goal of this implementation is to display a simplified “confirmation page” to the end 
user. Instead of a complete list of federation IdPs, the user is presented with a short list of 
recently visited IdPs, in reverse chronological order. For the majority of users, however, 
this list will be of length one.  
• Assuming most users have an account at at most one IdP, an obvious simplification is to 
automatically redirect to the only IdP on the list (without confirmation). The issue arises, 
however, if the user wishes to use a different IdP at a later time.  
• Currently, myVocs requires a user to be pre-registered. An unregistered user will not be 
able to use the myVocs system. Consequently, the request at step 11 of the myVocs 
protocol flow (see Figure 12) will fail. 
• myVocs’ understanding of a VO is simply a collection of attributes of persons represented 
by lists. Consequently, VO membership is list membership. List membership is defined by 
respective eduPersonPrincipalName (ePPN) and Mail attributes. myVocs expects 
the provisioning of ePPN by the federation IdPs. ePPN is globally unique and needs to be 
mapped onto a local identifier in the VO data base which is being installed during the 
initial registration. From myVocs’ perspective is this VO description sufficient. Whether 
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or not this will also be sufficient for D-Grid will be the topic of subsequent IVOM work 
packages.  
• As both the ePPN and the Mail attributes indicate the VO membership these are passed 
along in an assertion to an SP. As per today, other attributes, while stored during 
registration, are not passed along. Simply passing these additional attributes along to the 
SPs comes down to extending the SQL query and ARP that is used by the Shibboleth 
infrastructure within myVocs. Providing administrator or end-user control interfaces for 
those attributes, however, is not trivial. A tool like Sharpe from MAMS could help to 
solve this issue. 
• myVocs doesn’t currently support sub-VOs directly. As mentioned before, the VO 
concept as defined in myVocs considers groups with a static set of sub-groups defined as 
“owner”, “editor/admin”, and “member/subscriber” that currently act as authorization sub-
groups (aka roles). Because these groups/roles are directly inherited from the Sympa 
subsystem they can communicate using the email addresses ”voname-owner@domain” 
and “voname-editor@domain”. The only difference from these addresses and the 
“voname@domain” address is that they are simple email expansions and don’t have the 
bounce/subscribe/archive options of the parent “voname@domain” list. To overcome the 
VO/sub-VO configuration issue either the Sympa umbrella lists or the Grouper effort my 
help, but both haven’t been tested for supporting VO/sub-VO configurations in myVocs.  
9.6 myVocs in Context 
9.6.1 myVocs and Globus 
myVocs box includes both the GridShib CA and the GridShib for Shibboleth components from the 
GridShib project [GeRo06]. The GridShib CA will issue short term certificates to users that can be 
used to access Globus resources. The GridShib for Shibboleth interface makes it possible to feed 
collaboration group membership information to Globus resources located in any domain by using 
GridShib through myVocs. To achieve this, identity federation would actually require a translation 
of the user’s affiliation name to the name by which they are known in the virtual organization, 
which would, in turn, be translated into a X.509 DN [WeSi06].  
myVocs handles the first translation through the use of its internal databases when a user registers. 
The second translation, from myVocs into the Grid domain, is processed by a certificate registry 
service, which is a Gridshib service on the myVocs Shibboleth server. It allows an X.509 user to 
assert an X.509 certification through the standard Shibboleth authentication process. The 
Shibboleth server then binds those two names for the purpose of future identification. Since the 
Shibboleth server can recognize that a particular X.509 identity is bound to a specific local identity, 
it can feed back the appropriate attributes [WeSi06].  
In myVocs, a Virtual Organization (VO) manages any number of Web resources. With GridShib 
installed, the same VO may include any number of Grid resources protected by Grid SPs (see 
Figure 15) 
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Figure 15: myVocs and Gridshib [Scav06b] 
9.6.2 myVocs and VOMS/VOMRS 
The Virtual Organization Membership Service (VOMS) stores attributes and X.509 DNs and issues 
short term certificates based on this information. The Virtual Organization Membership 
Registration Service (VOMRS), on the other hand, provides the workflows necessary for 
registering users, organizing them by institution, assigning groups, granting roles, and coordinating 
approval of these by institutional, VO and/or resource representatives. The resulting attributes are 
stored in a VOMRS database, which is used to fill the VO-specific VOMS databases. All attributes 
are separately queryable. 
Like VOMS, myVocs places the control of VO attributes closer to the VO resources that require 
them. Rather than depending on federation IdPs, myVocs allows VOs to manage their own 
attributes. Thus, VO resources can leverage standard federation attributes (such as 
eduPersonScopedAffiliation and eduPersonPrincipalName) as well as any VO 
attributes that are maintained locally. Integrating VOMS and myVocs requires managing VOMS 
roles as myVocs attributes. 
There are two opportunities of integrating such VO-based attributes with Shibboleth IdP concepts 
in Grids [Sill06]: one way is to keep all external Grid pieces the same as in the present VO-based 
workflows and introduce extra assertions via SAML (or, in principle, XACML) to augment the 
PDP decision. Mapping to accounts may then optionally be done as before, or by GridShib. The 
other way it to replace the external X.509 dependancy by one of many Shibboleth-based IdP 
replacement schemes like GridShib + myVocs and obtain the VO attributes from VOMRS by a 
Web Services call or by importing the VOMRS attribute database directly (as depicted in Figure 
16). 
IVOM Work Package 1:  Evaluation of international Shibboleth-based VO Management Projects 35 




Figure 16: myVocs and VOMRS integration [Sill06] 
9.6.3 myVocs and MAMS 
myVocs and MAMS are pursuing the same goals. However, in order to overcome the difficulties of 
supporting attributes beyond e.g. eduPerson’s eduPersonAffiliation and 
eduPersonScopedAffiliation or eduPersonPrincipalName,  they use different 
approaches: a VO oriented approach and a user oriented approach. myVocs is – just like VOMS – a 
representative of the first category, whereas MAMS belongs to the latter class.  
As a VO oriented tool, myVocs places the management of VO attributes close to the VO resources 
that require these attributes. Instead of depending on federated IdPs with a standardized central set 
of attributes, myVocs allows VOs to manage their own attributes (as depicted in Figure 11 and 
Figure 12). Thus, VO resources can be protected not only by standard federation attributes (such as 
the eduPerson ones) but also by any other VO-specific attribute defined and maintained locally. By 
contrast, in MAMS the user decides herself on the attributes (by using Autograph.). 




The integration of Shibboleth with Grid middleware and the VO management concept is an 
ongoing process. Even the most advanced product in this field, GridShib, is available only as a beta 
version. myVocs and IAMSuite were the first products that started the integration of VO 
management in Shibboleth. myVocs is currently available as a 0.1 release and IAMSuite as a 
online demo. These products are in an early stage of development. We do not expect mature public 
releases of these products before 2008. That said, we have to make clear that the evaluated products 
already contain sufficient functionality to start working with them. 
Two products developed by the Internet2 community were previously seen as candidate VO 
management systems: Grouper [Grouper] and Signet [Signet]. So far they lack a Shibboleth 
Attribute Authority component and it is not clear if development of these systems will proceed into 
that direction.  
The Grid-relatedness of the products evaluated in this work package differs to a considerable 
degree.  IAMSuite and myVocs are true Shibboleth-enabled VO management systems. GridShib is 
a modular product to integrate Shibboleth with Globus Toolkit Grid middleware. PERMIS is a 
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RBAC authorization infrastructure that can interface to Shibboleth and GT. VOMS and VOMRS 
are classical certificate-based VO management systems, developed for the Grid. 
As the evaluated products address diverse problem domains they cannot be compared with each 
other. Therefore we define the following categories: 
• Shibboleth/Grid integration: GridShib (GT) and Interoperability Shibboleth-gLite in 
EGEE II. 
• Shibboleth-based VO management: myVocs and IAMSuite. 
• Certificate-based VO management: VOMS and VOMRS. 
• Policy-based authorization framework: PERMIS. 
In the Shibboleth/Grid integration category GridShib stands out as the first and most advanced 
project. GridShib has proven its ability to execute by continuously improving the product and 
extending the scope. The Interoperability Shibboleth-gLite project started later and is in a rather 
early phase. 
In the area of Shibboleth-based VO management myVocs is available as an early release version 
with basic functionality. GridShib and myVocs cooperate and as a result myVocs box was recently 
released as an integrated package containing GridShib for Shibboleth, GridShib CA and myVocs 
itself. IAMSuite is available only as an online prototype. Both systems, as well as the Shibboleth-
gLite integration implemented by SWITCH, extract attributes from the IdP assertion and assert 
them as their own. We believe this to be not a good practice as we pointed out in chapter 3.2. Due 
to the current architectural constraints of Shibboleth they function as IdP Proxies (see chapter 3). 
This may possibly change in the future, when Shibboleth gets enhanced to support multiple 
attribute authorities. 
Certificate-based VO management systems are available for some time and have achieved a 
considerable level of maturity. Support for VOMS attribute certificates, originally developed 
within the gLite context, is currently implemented for the GT. It is possible to combine the 
GridShib PDP and the VOMS PDP on GT4 resources
9
, thus allowing for the use of attributes taken 
from both, a SAML assertion and an attribute certificate, for authorization decisions. The main 
advantage of VOMS-based VO management in D-Grid is the currently available or planned 
support of VOMS attribute certificates in all three middlewares: gLite has complete and stable 
support for attribute certificates, a PDP for the Globus Toolkit is available as part of GridShib for 
GT 0.5.1 and support for UNICORE is under way in an IVOM work package. 
As for policy-based authorization frameworks, PERMIS is the only candidate in this report. There 
have been several projects integrating PERMIS with e.g. Shibboleth, GT3 and GT4, GridShib, 
Apache Web Server, etc. However, gLite and UNICORE are by now not among the supported 
technologies. 
In most cases the VO management systems are developed for a specific Grid middleware. 
Consequently, the use of a specific middleware determines the choice of the Shibboleth/Grid 
integration solution and subsequent tools like the VO management system. Therefore the listed 
products form distinctive ecosystems grouped around the respective Grid middleware: 
• Globus Toolkit 4 ecosystem: GridShib, myVocs, IAMSuite, VOMRS, VOMS (porting in 
work), PERMIS. 
• gLite ecosystem: Shibboleth/gLite integration in EGEE II, VOMS, VOMRS. 
• UNICORE ecosystem: Shibboleth and VOMS integration is an ongoing part of IVOM. 
Due to GridShib and myVocs the Globus Toolkit ecosystem is currently the most advanced in the 
field of Shibboleth and Grid integration. Work on the Shibboleth/gLite integration was recently 
started by SWITCH. 
 
 
                                                           
9
 http://gridshib.globus.org/docs/gridshib-gt-0.5.1/admin-index.html#VOMS 
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Features IAMSuite myVocs VOMS VOMRS 
A. Profile 






2. AAI base Shibboleth Shibboleth X.509 PKI X.509 PKI 
3. Release state (April 2007) Web prototype Beta Stable Stable 
4. Software base GridSphere Sympa VOMS VOMRS 
5. Maintainer MAMS UAB INFN11 USCMS/Fermilab 
B. Interoperability with Grid Middleware 
1. Compatibility with GT 2 - - - n/a 
2. Compatibility with GT 4 Planned Integration with GridShib (X)10  n/a 
3. Compatibility with gLite - - X n/a 
4. Compatibility with Unicore - - X (IVOM) n/a 
5. Compatibility with GridShib - X X n/a 
C. Scalability 
1. Maximum number of VOs unlimited unlimited 1 DB per VO, # of DBS 
limited by system resources 
1 DB per VO, # of DBS 
limited by system resources 
2. Maximum number of users unlimited unlimited No specific limit No specific limit 
D. VO Management 
1. Multiple memberships (user 
can be member of more 
than one VO) 
X X X X 
2. Different rights/roles per 
VO user (static) 
X X X X 
3. Different rights/roles per 
VO user (flexible) 
X (X)12 X X 
E. VO Administration 
1. Easy VO setup X X X X 
2. VO admin can invite/enlist 
users 
X X X X 
3. VO admin can de-list users X X X X 
F. Interoperability with Short Lived Credential Services 
1. Supports own SLCS (one  
SLCS per VO server) 
X X13 - - 





 X X 
G. Handling of IdP Assertions 
1. Attributes imported from IdP 
assertion to identify user 
eduPersonTargetedID, mail eduPersonPrincipalName, 
mail 
n/a n/a 
2. Additional attributes imported 
from IdP assertion 
eduPersonEntitlement, uid, 
cn, givenName, sn, o 
all attributes released to 
myVocs by an IdP 
n/a n/a 
3. Embedding of original IdP 
assertion in VO assertion 
- - n/a n/a 
H1. Issuing of VO Attributes: SAML Assertions 
1. Issuing of VO assertions X X n/a n/a 




ePPN, mail from eduPerson; 
a custom “group” attribute in 
the format role@vo 
n/a n/a 
3. Additional attributes included 
in VO assertion 
eduPersonScopedAffiliation, 
mail, givenName, sn, o 
- n/a n/a 
 H2. Issuing of VO Attributes:  Attribute Certificates 
1. Support of Attribute 
Certificates 
n/a n/a X n/a 
                                                           
10
 VOMS-PDP for GT4 is available as „technical preview“ and will be part of GT4.2 
11
 https://twiki.cnaf.infn.it/cgi-bin/twiki/view/VOMS/WebHome  
12
 Not via a UI. 
13
 SLCSs are independent of the core of myVocs.  
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Features IAMSuite myVocs VOMS VOMRS 
2. Representation of VO 
membership 
n/a n/a FQAN (Fully Qualified 
Attribute Name: VO, Group, 
Role, Capability) 
n/a 




   While VOMS does not rely on 
Shibboleth techniques, it is 
possible to combine it with 
Shibboleth-enabled 
environments for VO-
Management, such as 
GridShib or VASH 
VOMRS can be deployed 
together with VOMS. Then 
see VOMS for capabilities for 
points G and H. 
Table 2: Comparison of VO management systems 
X implies that the feature is supported. A dash means “not supported”. “n/a” means “not 
applicable”. 
In Table 2 the Shibboleth- and PKI-based VO management systems are compared against a set of 
features, which were identified in the evaluation process. 
11 Conclusion 
It is our objective in this work package to lay the ground work for the process of selecting 
prospective Grid and Shibboleth integration technologies and VO management products in D-Grid. 
The decision on the choice of technologies and products will be based on the final set of 
requirements to be determined in IVOM work package 2. 
A considerable set of products is emerging in the field of integration of X.509-based Grid 
environments with Shibboleth/SAML. We have evaluated a selection of these technologies as well 
as Shibboleth-based and PKI-based VO management systems to assess their suitability as 
integration and management tools in Grids. The projects under evaluation were the gLite-
Shibboleth integration, GridShib, IAMSuite, myVocs, PERMIS, VOMS and VOMRS.  
GridShib had a head start in the field of Grid and Shibboleth integration and maintains a lead over 
the peer projects. It currently offers the broadest set of solutions and is the best starting point for 
Grid and Shibboleth integration, given it takes place in the Globus ecosystem. 
While myVocs is restricted regarding both the attribute handling and the user/admin support, it is 
however flexible enough to pave the way for a VO management in Grids utilizing Shibboleth-based 
federations of IdPs and Grid Service Providers. Bridging collections of IdPs and SPs is a 
requirement when transparently managing VOs in non-trivial configurations. myVocs supports this 
objective. Combined with functionalities from other projects myVocs would be a first-choice 
candidate to further explore in IVOM. IAMSuite, developed by MAMS, is not yet available as a 
software product and can therefore not be recommended here. 
VOMS is a mature and stable VO-Management system developed as part of the gLite middleware. 
It is used in production environments, especially in the HEP communities, for several years and 
such is the de-facto standard in PKI-based VO management. Furthermore it is being actively 
enhanced with new features such as support for arbitrary attribute-value-pairs, which is an essential 
feature for flexible VO management. The importance of VOMS is also reflected by the ongoing 
integration of attribute certificates in additional Grid middlewares such as the Globus Toolkit 4. 
Due to its support in different Grid middlewares and its maturity it is advised to consider VOMS in 
work package 3 and assess its suitability for IVOM based on the results of work package 2. It has 
to be considered that VOMS itself does not offer the integration of Shibboleth-based campus 
attributes, which is an essential goal of IVOM. Means would have to be found to combine VOMS 
with Shibboleth, e.g. by using GridShib or an approach similar to the VASH service by SWITCH. 
VOMRS offers only a subset of the features of VOMS, but implements them in a more streamlined 
way, thereby lessening the burden imposed on VO administrators. However, VOMRS can be used 
as a front-end of a VOMS-server, offering the complete functionality of VOMS and the 
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streamlined workflows of VOMRS. As the VOMS developers currently plan to overhaul the 
VOMS web interface, VOMRS might not be necessary any more when this VOMS version will be 
released. 
PERMIS is a system for policy-based authorization, which has already a longer history, however, 
support for grid infrastructure and GridShib has been introduced rather recently. It is in active 
development. The system provides all components needed for establishing and maintaining an 
authorization infrastructure to be used in, but not limited to, grid environments. 
In IVOM work package 3 we will consider all products evaluated for their suitability in regard to 
the community requirements, which will be the deliverable of work package 2. Based on our 
review we think that the following products are the best-of-breed approaches for VO management 
currently available: 
• VOMS and VOMRS offer support for long-time Grid users with an established PKI 
infrastructure. If additional Shibboleth-based campus attributes are needed for authorization, 
means have to be found to make these attributes available to Grid resources, e.g. by using 
GridShib. 
• GridShib used in co-operation with myVocs or VOMS offers support for Grids utilizing PKI-
based authentication and Shibboleth-based authorization in the Globus Toolkit ecosystem. This 
approach especially supports the leveraging of the campus attributes managed by the user’s 
home IdPs. gLite users can utilize their VO-attributes immediately if VOMS is used. Though, 
gLite users will have to wait for the deliverables of the gLite/Shibboleth Integration project to 
use their campus attributes or VO-attributes managed by myVocs. 
• GridShib and myVocs offer support for Grids utilizing Shibboleth for both, authentication and 
authorization, in the Globus Toolkit ecosystem. The primary use cases are Portal-based Grid 
access and SLC-based Grid access. gLite users will have to wait for the deliverables of the 
gLite/Shibboleth Integration project at SWITCH.  
This evaluation is a snapshot of products in a highly dynamic research environment. Readers 
should be aware that most of these products are in an ongoing development process. 
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This report is a team work product. The introduction and the closing chapters were written 
collectively by all authors. The work on the other chapters was split among the project members, 
the leading authors for these parts are given here as contact persons:  
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3 Shibboleth and VO Management Siegfried Makedanz, Hans Pfeiffenberger 
4 gLite and Shibboleth: Work done by 
SWITCH 
Christian Grimm, Ralf Gröper 
5 Globus Toolkit and Shibboleth: 
GridShib 
Christian Grimm, Ralf Gröper 
6 PERMIS Peter Gietz, Martin Haase 
7 MAMS’ VO-related Work Siegfried Makedanz, Hans Pfeiffenberger 
8 VOMS and VOMRS Christian Grimm, Ralf Gröper 
9 Virtual Organization Collaboration 
System (myVocs) 
Michael Schiffers 
   
14 List of Abbreviations 
AA Attribute Authority 
AAI Authentication and Authorization Infrastructure 
AC Attribute Certificate 
ACL Access Control List 
API Application Programming Interface 
AuthN Authentication 
AuthZ Authorization 
CA Certificate Authority 
CMS Content Management System 
CN Common Name 
DFN Das Deutsche Forschungsnetz 
DN Distinguished Name 
DyVOSE Dynamic Virtual Organization in e-Science Education 
ePPN eduPersonPrincipalName 
GT Globus Toolkit 
GUI Graphical User Interface 
HPC High Performance Computing 
IAM Identity and Access Management 
IdM Identity Management 
IdP Identity Provider 
IT Information Technology 
IVOM Interoperabilität und Integration der VO-Management Technologien 
im D-Grid  
JSR Java Specification Request 
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol 
MAMS Meta Access Management System 
O Organization 
OASIS Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information 
Standards 
OU Organizational Unit 
PDP Policy Decision Point 
PEP Policy Enforcement Point 
PIP Policy Information Point 
PKI Public Key Infrastructure 
RAP Role Assignment Policy (PERMIS) 
RBAC Role Based Access Control 
RFT Reliable File Transfer 
SAML Secure Assertion Markup Language 
ShARPE Shibboleth Attribute Release Policy Editor 
ShibGS Shibbolized GridSphere 
SLC Short-Lived Credential 
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SLCS Short-Lived Credential Service 
SOA Source of Authority (PERMIS) 
SP Service Provider 
SSO Single Sign On 
TAGPMA The Americas Grid Policy Management Authority 
TAP Target Access Policy (PERMIS) 
TVO Trust Virtual Organization 
UAB University of Alabama at Birmingham 
UNICORE Uniform Interface to Computing Resources 
Vocs Virtual Organization Collaboration System  
VO Virtual Organization 
VOMRS Virtual Organization Membership Registration Service 
VOMS Virtual Organization Membership Service 
WAYF Where Are You From 
WS-GRAM Web Service Grid Resource Allocation Manager 
XACML Extensible Access Control Markup Language 
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